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Price Discrimination “Just For You”—A Proposal to
Increase Enforcement of Vertical Restraints that
are Designed to Sustain Personalized Pricing

N OGA BLICKSTEIN S HCHORY *©

Abstract

In e-commerce, there is a growing use of personalized pricing. Personalized
pricing is the tailoring of an individual price to each individual consumer so that
different consumers pay different prices for the same product. This practice relies
on the use of big data regarding each consumer’s unique elasticity of demand. The
results of this practice include, on the one hand, a potential increase in output and,
on the other, the almost complete transfer of welfare from consumers to sellers. It
also causes potential reduction of welfare and other distributive effects.
Personalized pricing rests, inter alia, on consumers’ inability to arbitrage and
thereby cause price convergence. To guarantee this inability, sellers often impose
direct or indirect restraints, known as vertical restraints, that prevent consumers
from re-trading the product.
This article examines the implications of the shift toward personalized pricing,
including how online vertical restraints are often adopted to support personalized
pricing. As argued herein, although the law explicitly prohibits both price
discrimination and anticompetitive vertical restraints on trade, the developments
in economic thought have led courts to approach each of these practices with a
permissive stance. The problem is that vertical restraints that are imposed to
sustain personalized pricing cannot be justified solely for doing so. The
anticompetitive effects undermine the procompetitive effects underlying the
tolerance toward price discrimination. To prevent that problem, this article argues
that courts should adopt a stricter approach toward vertical restraints designed to
sustain personalized pricing. Practically, it suggests increasing antitrust scrutiny by
adopting a presumption that restrictive arrangements that are directly tied to
personalized prices are anticompetitive. Accordingly, such behavior will suffice to
make a prima facie case against these arrangements, which then can be rebutted
by the defense by showing a procompetitive justification. To avoid over-litigation
and chilling effects, this article suggests several exemptions from this presumption.
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Price Discrimination “Just For You”
I. Introduction

An important conference is taking place next week, a few hours’ drive from
Professor A’s town, and he is about to present a study he has been working on for
a long time. He convinces Professor B to register with him so they can both visit
friends. However, car rentals in Professor A’s town are pricey this weekend, and he
cannot get a reasonable price. All of a sudden, professor B calls, announcing there
is a 50% discount at one of their town’s car rental companies!
Professor A logs in to the exact same website his colleague mentioned but sees
no discount. Turns out the ad Professor B saw said, “CAR RENTAL, 50% DISCOUNT –
JUST FOR YOU!” so the discount was not available to professor A. He asks Professor
B whether she could make the rental on his behalf so he can enjoy the price she
got. She tries but finds out the car rental makes it explicit that the rental price is just
for her, so she cannot rent for someone else. As Professor A would not dare miss
the opportunity to present at this conference, he ends up paying the higher price
the rental demanded.
In the age of e-commerce, variations of this frustrating story are constantly
growing in many day-to-day commodity and service markets.1 In these occurrences,
sellers use personalized pricing—that is, a price (high or low) tailored to a particular
consumer and to a particular time frame. Additionally, to sustain this practice,
sellers impose contractual or other vertical restraints to limit the transferability of
the product or service and to prevent a resale of the commodity under the exclusive
price.2 Because of these combined practices, in many markets, different consumers
receive a different price proposition for the same product and are unable to share
the advantage. Such occurrences are often annoying and are considered “unfair.”
The “free market” is believed to be one in which market forces work simultaneously
to offer all consumers the same price.3 However, personalized pricing and vertical
restraints, together, eliminate single-price equilibrium.4 The resulting distribution
of prices, which counters the understanding of the free market, hints that market

© Noga Blickstein Shchory, 2021.
* Noga Blickstein Shchory is an Attorney at the District Attorney’s Office in Tel Aviv (Fiscal and Economy),
a PhD candidate in the University of Haifa School of Law, and a member of the Center for Cyber Law and Policy
at the University of Haifa. A previous version of this paper was nominated for the best Student paper category
award in Concurrences, Antitrust Publications & Events. I thank Michal Gal, Elad Pinchas and Ram Shchory for
their useful comments to this paper. Any mistakes or omissions remain the author’s
1. Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination When Demand is a Function of Both Preferences and
(Mis) Perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 224-25 (2019); ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION:
THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY, 89-94 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2016); Ariel Ezrachi, &
Maurice E. Stucke, The Rise of Behavioural Discrimination, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 485 (2016).
2. ANNA BERNASEK & D. T. MONGAN, ALL YOU CAN PAY 82 (Nation Books, 2015).
3. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 8-9 (Pearson Education, Inc., 7th ed. 2009).
4. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern
Economics: Time for Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1240-41, 1253 (2010).
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forces do not function well enough. Indeed, consumers’ dissatisfaction and their
intuition about market prices are not enough to set legal policy. However, it does
raise the need to rethink these practices and their effects on the economy.
The economic literature on these practices exposes a complicated balance
between their anticompetitive effects and their procompetitive effects. In
particular, while personalized pricing may increase output, it has indecisive
aggregate welfare effects, and it is likely to cause the almost complete transfer of
welfare from consumers to sellers as well as other distributive effects. Another
important point regarding personalized pricing is that it is based on data power, and
accordingly, it is not always related to market power, which was the key factor in
traditional price discrimination. As a result, even small firms can exercise it. The
economic literature on vertical restrictive arrangements (i.e., arrangements
between consecutive links in the distribution chain, such as producer and
distributor; in contrast, “horizontal” restraints occur between competitors) 5
indicates that these arrangements cause additional harm to consumers, but at
times, these arrangements may also be economically justified. For example, for
increasing consumer choice or for encouraging inter-brand competition. This article
highlights the concern that, unlike other justifications, the declared purpose to
sustain personalized pricing is not a sufficient justification and that vertical
restraints that are designed for that purpose undermines some of the
procompetitive effects of personalized pricing.
Tracing back the legislative history reveals that Congress banned both these
practices through two federal acts: the Sherman Act (prohibiting all restraints of
trade)6 and the Robinson-Patman Act (prohibiting price discrimination). 7
Nevertheless, under the influence of the Chicago School of Economics from the
1970s onward,8 acknowledged that each of these practices, separately, may
potentially increase consumer welfare. In response, courts narrowed their
interpretations of these laws, stating that, at times, such practices will be allowed.
Thus, price discrimination was allowed even when found to be extremely
discriminatory, and even when it was practiced by powerful market players, as long
as it was not exercised for the creation of power. Because personalized pricing is
not designed to acquire a competitor’s market power but only to extract more of
the consumers’ welfare, current interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act does
not prohibit personalized pricing as such. Additionally, the prohibition against

5. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988); Louis Kaplow, The Meaning of Vertical
Agreement and the Structure of Competition Law, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 563, 563 (2016), (interpreting vertical
arrangements as unilateral conducts).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
8. JOHN E. KWOKA & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY, 6-8
(Oxford Univ. Press Inc, 7th ed. 2019).
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restrictive arrangements was also narrowed by subjecting claims against vertical
agreements to a more complicated litigation standard. At no point did the courts
consider the specific characteristics of vertical restraints designed to protect
personalized pricing, which, as argued in this article, undermine the procompetitive
effects of personalized pricing it pretends to protect. This article argues that in light
of these special characteristics, as well as the technological developments that have
transformed price discrimination into personalized pricing, increasing its scope and
prevalence, vertical restraints designed to sustain personalized pricing should be
closely examined.
Personalized pricing in e-commerce has drawn much public and scholarly
attention. Most scholars have analyzed this practice as a private case of price
discrimination, focusing on the extensive use of data to enable it and suggesting
that this practice should be restricted. For example, Woodcock argued that
personalized pricing requires a shift in the antitrust approach, through a campaign
to deconcentrate American industries, the active use of big data to preserve
consumer welfare, or a ban on the tailoring of prices. 9 Ezrachi and Stucke argued
that information platforms that exercise behavioral pricing (data-based dynamic
discrimination, which resembles personalized pricing) may cause negative
distributive effects and should be closely examined. 10 Bernasek and Mongan argued
that personalized pricing undermines the basic concepts of the market, shifting all
the power to sellers.11 In their book, they also discuss vertical restraints, which
support personalized pricing, including restraints in the form of product
customization.12 Nevertheless, Bernasek and Mongan eventually made a proposal
that overlooks the connection between personalized pricing and vertical restraints
or product customization, calling for a worldwide movement to understand data
and negotiate its use.13 Bar Gill pointed to personalized pricing’s potential harm to
consumer welfare and called for exploring the potential of personalized law. 14
Chapdelaine reviewed personalized pricing from a broad perspective, going beyond
competition to problems of fairness, privacy, or autonomy and recommended
disclosure rules as well as complete banning of several pricing practices.15 Generally
speaking, the existing literature either condemns personalized pricing outright or
the collection and abuse of data to achieve such personalized pricing. Yet, there is
no focus on market practices that allow sellers to maintain personalized pricing or
possible measures to restrict these practices.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

56

Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376 (2017).
Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 1, at 136.
BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 38-40.
Id. at 98-113.
Id. at 98-113.
Bar-Gill, supra note 1, at 223.
Pascale Chapdelaine, Algorithmic Personalized Pricing, 17 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2020).
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Similarly, scholars researching vertical restraints also discussed the effects of ecommerce. For example, by explaining that in e-commerce it is easier for sellers to
design a contract that is overwhelming and confusing to consumers; therefore, such
scholars claim that e-commerce contracts may harm consumer choice. 16 However,
the literature so far has never highlighted the use of vertical restraints to sustain
personalized pricing, nor has it attempted to rethink our tolerant approach toward
these combined practices.
This article adds another dimension to this discussion by explaining how a
particular type of vertical restrictive arrangements, albeit their promulgated
purpose, undermines the procompetitive effects of personalized pricing, and by
proposing a legal solution: to adopt a presumption according to which vertical
restraints designed to sustain personalized prices are anticompetitive. 17 The use of
such a presumption will improve enforcement against these practices, and yet, it
can be rebutted in the appropriate circumstances. To reduce confusion in business
function, this article calls for the adoption of several exemptions, by which these
practices will not fall under the presumptive rule. Other justifications will have to
be proven by defendants with the traditional litigation toolkit.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the basic economics that
underlie personalized pricing, the convergence of prices in competitive markets,
and how restrictive arrangements may be used to prevent such convergence. Part
III traces both the interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act’s prohibition of price
discrimination and the Sherman Act’s prohibition of vertical restrictive
arrangements. Part IV makes a practical proposal to adopt a presumptive rule that
will allow current law to adapt to the problem reviewed herein. Part V offers a
conclusion.
II. Market Dynamics

This part describes the challenge of personalized pricing and the debate
regarding its procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. It then moves on to
explain how resale markets can lead to price convergence and the manner in which
sellers use vertical restraints to prevent such resale and price convergence.

16.

MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY, 150-51, 154-55 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2017).
Salil K. Mehra, Price Discrimination-Driven Algorithmic Collusion: Platforms for Durable Cartels, 26 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 171, 215-17 (2021)(suggesting that firms can collude in order to price discriminate together, and
expressing concern that vertical agreements between suppliers and distributors will support such personalized
pricing).
17.
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A. Personalized Pricing
Personalized pricing is a practice designed to tailor a product’s price to each
individual consumer’s perceived value of the product. 18 Sellers use data collected
about the consumer’s previous online transactions and other activity and, with
advanced data analysis techniques, micro-segment the market at the consumer
level, tailor the terms of a deal to each particular consumer, and discriminate
between consumers at a near-perfect level.19 To use the example from the
introduction, the seller may set the price for a consumer’s rental service by relying
on data relating to many factors, such as age, gender, marital status, travel
preference (alone or with friends), health conditions, financial status (including
checking account balance and whether the consumer had irregular expenses this
month), typical travel frequency and destination, the purpose of the trip, the
importance of the trip, and one’s psychological inclination to make an impulsive
purchase.
1. As a Private Case of Price Discrimination
In order to understand personalized pricing, it is useful to view it as a private
case of price discrimination. In taking that perspective, personalized pricing is an
efficient manner in which sellers can charge the consumer with the highest price
she is willing to pay, a price termed by economists as “consumer’s reservation
price.”20 In such transactions, consumers enjoy no welfare advantage beyond the
purchase itself. In economic terms, the delta between consumer welfare at the
reservation price and consumer welfare at market price is known as “consumer
surplus.” So, personalized pricing is, to begin with, a practice that allows sellers to
better identify the price under which the seller will be able to extract the entire
consumer surplus.21
Accordingly, personalized pricing is a private case of price discrimination.
However, price discrimination in brick-and-mortar commerce is not the same as
personalized pricing we encounter in online commerce. The distinction between

18. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL & ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS – COMPETITION
COMMITTEE,
Algorithmic
Collusion:
Problems
and
Counter
12-16
(2017),
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocmentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282017%2925&d
ocLanguage=En; EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 83; Rajnish Shankhdhar & Dr. Pragyan Dangwal, Exploring
Behavioral Pricing Practices on E-Commerce, 3 INT’L J. OF HUMAN. AND MGMT. SCI. 179 (2015).
19. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1; EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 96-99; Bar-Gill, supra note 1, at 218219.
20. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 85.
21. Id. at 86; BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 3-4; Michael D. Guttentag, Law and Surplus:
Opportunities Missed, 19 UTAH L. REV. 607, 611-12 (2019); Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case
Against Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 566 (2006); Woodcock, supra
note 9, at 1380.
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them derives from a typology created by the English economist Pigou—namely,
“first degree,” “second degree,” and “third degree” discrimination. 22 “First degree”
discrimination is one in which firms can charge every consumer the maximum price
the consumer is willing to pay, thereby extracting the entire consumer surplus.23
Personalized pricing (i.e., giving each individual a unique price) is approaching such
perfect “first degree” discrimination (although it is commonly said not to have
reached it yet).24 In contrast, brick-and-mortar discrimination typically fails to
discriminate against individual consumers and, therefore, elects a rougher form of
discrimination, which can extract a smaller part of the consumer surplus. 25 Such
discrimination could be “second degree” discrimination, in which pricing is set in
correlation to the number of products purchased (e.g., quantity rebates), thereby,
proposing lower prices to larger consumers and higher prices to smaller consumers,
potentially excluding competitors from the market.26 Alternatively, brick-andmortar discrimination could be “third degree” price discrimination, which relies on
general market segmentation. This form of discrimination is intended to better
estimate consumers’ willingness to pay (e.g., student, military personnel, or older
adult discounts).27
There is abundant economic literature regarding the advantages and
disadvantages of price discrimination, mainly focusing on the effects of “third
degree” discrimination. A review of this entire scholarship exceeds the scope of this
article.28 Nonetheless, this article will review some of the considerations that are
most relevant to the case at hand. The most essential economic argument in favor
of price discrimination is that it is expected to increase output and, presumably,
increase aggregate welfare.29 The problem is that this economic outcome depends
on a large set of assumptions regarding the market conditions in which the
discrimination takes place, which do not necessarily materialize in the real world.30
22.

ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 279 (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 4th ed., 1962).
Id. at 279; Pindyk & Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 401-04.
24. David Ulph & Nir Vulkan, Electronic Commerce and Competitive First-Degree Price Discrimination
(2000) (unpublished comment) (on file with the University of Bristol Department of Economics); Ezrachi &
Stucke, Virtual Competition, supra note 1, at 96-99.
25. Pindyk & Rubinfeld, supra note 3, p. 402-404.
26. Pigou, supra note 22, at 279; Pindyk & Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 404.
27. Pigou, supra note 22, at 279; Pindyk & Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 404-07; Marius Schwartz, ThirdDegree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing A Welfare Result, 80.5 AM. ECON. REV. 1259, 1259 (1990).
28. For a comprehensive review, see OECD, ROUNDTABLE ON “PRICE DISCRIMINATION” (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/us-submissions-oecd-2010-present-other-internationalcompetition-fora/price_discrimination_united_states.pdf.
29. FED. TRADE COMM’N., A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES, 4 (2016).
30. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1252 (2010) (finding that “the academic literature established
definite welfare results for price discrimination only for a small set of well-defined cases that in general, would
be hard to identify in the real world… absent sufficient entry and sufficiently intense price competition, many
counterintuitive and seemly perverse results are possible”); see also OECD Roundtable, supra note 28, at 3 (
23.
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While aggregate welfare effects are indecisive, price discrimination has
undisputed distributive effects, including the following:
(-) The fact that sellers extract more of consumer welfare creates a clear shift in welfare from
consumers to sellers.31 Assuming that these corporations are held by the wealthy and not by
those who use most of their income for their living, this transfer of money will cause
substantial distribution effects.
(-) By giving some consumers discounted purchase opportunities while giving others purchase
options above the otherwise single market price, price discrimination creates inequity
between consumers, which could lead to increased wealth inequality and other aggravations
of discrimination among classes.32

An additional problem associated with price discrimination is that, according to
some commentators, the variation in prices for different consumers does not allow
competition to shift from prices to services, a type of competition that consumers
may prefer for some goods.33
Achieving the required balance between anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects is difficult. Scholars debating whether price discrimination should be banned
usually disagree regarding the term “consumer welfare,” known to describe the
goal of antitrust laws.34 One prevailing interpretation of this term equates
“consumer welfare” with the aggregate total welfare of “everyone” in the market. 35
This standard can include benefit to sellers. While such benefit is not immediately
in the interest of consumers, it can later lead to increase in output, consumer
choice, or innovation. Thus, increasing the welfare of those who shop. Proponents
of this standard are likely to be more tolerant of price discrimination. Another
interpretation could be using a “narrower, more familiar sense, equating it . . . with
the surplus of final purchasers.”36 This standard is sensitive to the decrease in
equality between sellers and consumers,37 and as a result, proponents of this
standard usually protest against price discrimination.

quoting ______ “It could be argued that competition policy should prohibit price discrimination even if it
permits simple monopoly pricing because price discrimination reduces static consumer welfare sufficiently
more than simple monopoly pricing. However, such a claim has no basis in economics. Economic models show
that ‘price discrimination may increase or decrease consumer welfare depending on market conditions.’”);
W]elfare. 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870 (1985).
31. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 24.
32. Federal Trade Commission Report, supra note 29.
33. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L.J. 373, 454-55 (1966).
34. JOHN J. FLYNN, HARRY FIRST & DARREN BUSH, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST, 25-26
(7th ed. 2014).
35. Woodcock, supra note 9, at1381-83.
36. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1260; Woodcock, supra note 9, at 1375, 1381-83.
37. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 118-21 (2018).
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The impact of personalized pricing, in the sense of the shift from “third degree”
toward “first degree” discrimination, is a test case for the distinction between the
two standards. Proponents of the aggregate welfare standard are still arguing over
the overall effect of this change.38 Some argue that this shift generates more
opportunities for otherwise underserved consumers,39 while others fear that this
effect will be undermined in markets that are not sufficiently competitive. 40
With no decisive increase of aggregate welfare, proponents of the narrower
consumer welfare standard looking at the shift toward “first degree” discrimination
meet a substantial and unequivocal transfer of welfare from consumers to sellers.
This effect, if allowed to prevail and expand in many industries, could deprive end
consumers of their buying resources, thus transferring their wealth to sellers. In the
age of concentrated industries, the result will likely be the transfer of wealth from
private, working class consumers to large corporations. Assuming that these
corporations are held by the wealthy and not by those who use most of their income
for their living, this transfer of money will cause substantial distribution effects.
Bernasek and Mongan predict such an alarming scenario in which middle-class
working families are deprived of their entire income so that they become unable to
save to afford their living expenses.41 With personalized pricing’s potential ability to
extract the entire welfare of consumers, this scenario may not be unrealistic. 42
In addition to these concerns is the concern regarding exacerbation of the
distributive welfare effects already associated with price discrimination, including
the aggravation of wealth inequality and discrimination among classes. 43 Such
concerns, although typically beyond antitrust analysis in the United States, may play
a role in competition regimes in other places in the world.44
2. The Reliance on User Data
In addition to viewing personalized pricing as a private case of price
discrimination, it is also helpful to focus on its reliance on user data. In personalized
pricing, the seller knows all there is to know about consumer reservation prices,

38.

Guttentag, supra note 21, at 645-49.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 29.
40. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1239-55; OECD Roundtable, supra note 28, at 3.
41. BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, ix-xii.
42. Woodcock, supra note 9, at 1374.
43. Gerhard Wagner & Horst Eidenmuller, Down by Algorithms: Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and
Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (2019);
BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 111; EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 120, 24-27..
44. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, pp. 1272-1292; Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law Goals and The Digital
Economy (Draft, 2018).
39.
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accurate for the particular moment of the proposal.45 Using this information, sellers
can not only charge based on consumers’ reservation price but can also use dynamic
pricing, which enables the seller to change prices, ad hoc, to fit the consumer’s
reservation price in any particular moment. 46
Additionally, in personalized pricing, the seller knows all there is to know about
the consumer’s psychological vulnerabilities, which may increase the chances of a
purchase. The use of such data allows the seller to influence what the consumer’s
reservation price will be (e.g., increasing demand by exploiting biases and willpower
vulnerabilities, using promotional decoys, engaging in price steering, increasing
complexity, or employing drip pricing).47 Economically speaking, a seller who is
already price discriminating, using data-based personalized pricing, can also shift
the demand curve to the right.48 Moreover, with these new techniques,
personalized pricing—unlike any other form of price discrimination—turns to both
consumers’ perceptions and misperceptions of the product proposition. The
problem is that if consumer choice is based on a magnified misperception of
product characteristics, it is less likely to generate consumer welfare, 49 even under
the aggregate standard of consumer welfare.
Another distinction between traditional price discrimination and data-based
personalized pricing has to do with the shift of the focus from the seller’s market
power toward the consumer’s vulnerability. In the context of price discrimination,
the seller was thought to be powerful enough to win the negotiation with any
consumer and to receive the consumer’s reservation price. 50 In contrast, under
personalized pricing, any seller who controls strategic and valuable data about the
consumer and holds the appropriate tools to analyze it (not necessarily a seller with
market power) can discriminate in price and shift the demand curve to the right. 51
In that sense, it is data power (i.e., the control of data and tools required to use it),
and not traditional market power, that can generate sales and that may distort the
function of the market.52 Data power is such a valuable asset that its use can easily
lead to the exclusion of competitors who lack such power. Importantly, there are
high access barriers to acquiring data power, including technological and legal

45. BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 67–93; Ezrachi & Stucke consider the ability to know all there is
to know about consumer reservation price, as a developing one, which had not yet reached perfection. See
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 87–88.
46. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 87–88.
47. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 94–95, 97, 105–13.
48. Id. at 101.
49. Bar-Gill, supra note 1, at 219–20.
50. Pigou created his distinction between three types of price discrimination for a discriminating
monopoly. PIGOU, supra note 22, at 278–79; See PINDYK ET AL., supra note 3, at 406–10, for a later work referring
to price discrimination as a game theory problem unique to pricing with power.
51. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 1, at 101.
52. Id. at 113-15.
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barriers in the collection and storage of data, problems of comparability in analyzing
and synthesizing it, and behavioral barriers in its implementation into use. 53 Only
those sellers that break these barriers and acquire sufficient control of unique
consumer data will be able to exercise and benefit from personalized pricing.
To be sure, the shift from market power to data power does not override the
influence of market power and competition over prices. Truly, market competition
may cause prices to converge, despite data power. However, for such a process to
take place, competition should be robust enough to make a sufficient influence. In
the next section, this article turns to the process of price convergence and the
various factors that should be calibrated correctly for that process to happen.
B. Market Forces that Cause Price Convergence
The process of price convergence can be best explained by the law of one price.
The economic principle of the law of one price states that in perfectly competitive
markets, prices will stabilize at single price equilibrium and that price discrimination
is thus impossible.54 This principle relies on multiple assumptions, including the
existence of multiple sellers and buyers, product homogeneity, no search costs, no
information asymmetries, no transaction costs, and no other market
imperfections.55 Because these assumptions are far from materializing in real-life
markets, price dispersion is common, 56 and it is useful to describe the law of one
price not as a permanent equilibrium but as an “attractor equilibrium,” which
means that market forces act to restore the single price equilibrium even if they fail
to do so.57
E-commerce improves the market function and thereby improves the force of
the attractor equilibrium, inter alia, by reducing search costs,58 transaction costs,59

53.

Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 349-68 (2017).
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 86–87.
55. James F. Nieberding & Robin A. Cantor, Price Dispersion and Class Certification in Antitrust Cases: An
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL ECON. 61, 74–75 (2007).
56. Id. at 75; see also Mian Dai et al., Is the Effect of Competition on Price Dispersion Nonmonotonic?:
Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 161 (2014).
57. Karl Gunnar Persson, The Law of One Price, Econ. Hist. Encyc. (Feb. 10, 2008),
https://www.eh.net/page/24/?s=fur.
58. See Michal S. Gal, The Power of the Crowd in the Sharing Economy, 13 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 29, 32-33
(2019); Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, 4.3 J. SELF-GOVERNANCE & MGMT. ECON., 7, 8-9 (2016); Samuel
Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy, 6 (Sept. 10, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with N.Y.U. Stearns Sch. Bus.).
59. Online purchase can be concluded from home, using developed payment verification methods (Such
as PayPal). Automated algorithms that are designed to facilitate the purchase process, known as digital
assistants, will reduce transaction costs even more, potentially purchasing any commodity on behalf of the
consumer. See Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 309, 320-21
(2017).
54.
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and information asymmetries.60 Nevertheless, even in e-commerce, markets are
not perfect.61 For example, in e-markets that suffer from a scarcity of sellers, 62 there
is concern about sellers collaborating so they can all impose similar price
discrimination, restricting the ability of market forces to correct against it.63 As this
example shows, in imperfect competition, market forces even in e-commerce
cannot be trusted to cause price convergence that will cancel the price differences
of personalized pricing.
One prominent concern is that in a market in which all sellers personalize their
prices, competing sellers, even without collaboration, will not offer a substantial
promotion to a consumer with high reservation prices. Under this concern,
consumers may enjoy price competition, but only to a limited extent, compatible
with their individual positions on the demand curve. The result is that if
personalized pricing expands in the market, even with no market power or
competitor’s collaboration, market competition will not fully correct against it.
One of the elements that has traditionally mitigated the concern of price
discrimination is the development of resale markets, which are less inclined to
exhibit such price discrimination, for reasons subsequently detailed.64 This article
begins with describing resale markets. Resale markets can materialize in various
manners. They can offer used goods (e.g., a secondhand bookshop) or unused
goods (e.g., resale of concert tickets, resale of stock from a bankrupt retailer); 65
permanent resale (i.e., ownership is transferred) or temporary resale (i.e., renting
of durable goods for limited periods of time, such as books from the library); 66
multiple sellers (e.g., eBay) or a concentrated marketplace (e.g., controlled by
60. See Noga Blickstein Shchory, Information Asymmetries in E-Commerce: The Challenge of Credence
Qualities, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 20 (2020).
61. A prominent example of a market variable that is less affected by e-commerce, is the expensive
transaction costs associated with shipment of heavy products (although inventory can be better managed in ecommerce). See Zhaolin (Erick) Li, et al., Online Versus Bricks-And-Mortar Retailing: A Comparison of Price,
Assortment and Delivery Time, 53 INT’L J. PROD. RSCH. 3823, 3826-27 (2015); Another problem that is still
prevalent in e-commerce is the information asymmetries of products’ credence qualities. See Blickstein
Shchory, supra note 600, at 26-29.
62. This will be the case with commodities that their production requires scale and proficiency, rather than
with products that can be easily homemade (compare the production of hardware with handcrafts). See Gal,
supra note 58, at 36-37.
63. See Mehra, supra note 17, at 213; Other scholars pointed, in general, to the concern that e-commerce
facilitates competitors’ collaboration even in markets with multiple sellers. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note1,
at 147, 149-51, 155-56; see also Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 67, 10405 (2019).
64. Take for example the Second Circuit’s focus on the resale of ingot (referred to, in the holding, as the
“secondary ingot market”), in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 425-26, 429 (2d Cir.
1945).
65. P. Van Cayseele, Lemons, Peaches and Creampuffs: The Economics of a Second-Hand Market, TIJDSCHNFT
VOOR ECONOMIE EN MANAGEMENT 73, 78 (1993).
66. Schor, supra note 58, at 10; Cayseele, supra note 65, at 74-76, 79-80.
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“specialist” secondhand dealers, like a secondhand bookshop, or by the primary
seller making a resale, like car trade-ins).67 This article focuses on permanent resale
markets in which end consumers sell—that is, a highly distributed resale market
known as “second hand” resale.
This article argues that, typically, sellers in “second hand” distributed resale
markets are unlikely to use personalized pricing. The reason is that personalized
pricing requires a costly investment in big data, which in turn creates an advantage
for large, repeat market players with an increased interest in the market. In highly
distributed resale trade, sellers generally do not possess big data and thus are
unable to exercise personalized pricing, let alone personalized pricing that is in
correlation to that exercised by primary market sellers. Indeed, the digital
intermediary on which resale is performed may be able to price discriminate on the
seller’s behalf—for example, by using a discriminatory algorithm that sets
personalized prices for transactions.68 However, such intervention of the
intermediary is only likely if the seller is a repeat market player, because an
individual who only sells once would like to sell at the highest price possible and
would have no interest in allowing the intermediary to discount on his behalf so
another seller can charge more.
Basic intuition suggests that resale markets compete with, and thereby to some
extent discipline, sellers in the primary market. 69 Importantly, the resale of products
does not necessarily reduce overpricing per se, because at times a monopoly can
capture the profits of the entire downstream market by overcharging for the
additional value of a product that can be resold.70 Additionally, the economic
literature has proven that a monopoly that could not otherwise segment the market
can use downstream trade to discriminate among consumers by restricting quantity
and/or by raising prices. The monopoly then sells to those who attach high value to
the product (including the value of a potential resale), who in turn sell to those who

67.

Cayseele, supra note 65, at 81
See How Uber’s dynamic pricing model works, Uber, https://www.uber.com/en-GB/blog/uberdynamic-pricing/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2021); See also Hostfully, An In-Depth Guide to Airbnb Smart Pricing
[+Alternatives], (July 6, 2021), https://www.hostfully.com/blog/airbnb-smart-pricing-and-alternatives/.
69. Simon P. Anderson & Victor A. Ginsburg, Price Discrimination via Second-hand Markets, 38 EUROPEAN
ECON. REV. 23, 23 (1994) (“A monopoly seller may gain or lose from the existence of a second-hand market”);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding that while “secondary”
markets do not compete at all in some uses, “for most purposes it competes upon a substantial equality with
‘virgin’”).
70. Peter L. Swan, Alcoa: The influence of Recycling on Monopoly Power, J. POL. ECON. 88, 76-99 (1980);
Peter L. Swan, Optimum Durability, Second-Hand Markets, and Planned Obsolescence, 80 J. Pol. Econ. 575
(1972); Peter L. Swan, Durability of Consumer Goods, 60 Am. Econ. Rev., 884 (1970); John Rust, When is it
Optimal to Kill Off the Market for Used Durable Goods?, ECONOMETRICA 54, 65-86 (1986); Anderson &
Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 42-43; Cayseele, supra note 64, at 76-77; Justin P. Johnson, Secondary Markets with
Changing Preferences, 42 RAND J. ECON. 555, (2011).
68.
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attach a lower value to it. 71 This potential resale (to a consumer who would not
otherwise purchase the product) will be charged for by the monopoly in the first
sale, increasing its profits.72 However, if the monopoly could already personalize
prices in the market at a near-perfect level, and is already extracting (almost) the
entire consumer welfare in the transaction, then it has nothing to gain from a resale
market. The resale market adds no new discrimination opportunity and offers no
advantage to the monopoly.
Provided that the resale market is not used by itself to segment the market, with
an active resale market, an arbitrage process will initiate. Consumers who received
a low-price offer from the monopoly will resell the product to consumers willing to
pay a higher price for it (in the example in the introduction, Professor B will rent the
car for Professor A and maybe even charge some broker fee). Consumers will
therefore refrain from buying at the monopoly’s higher price to begin with (in the
example, Professor A will not purchase directly from the rental company). Repeated
arbitrage, in turn, will spill over into the primary market and lead to price
convergence.73 Such a process is supposed to generate welfare because, if output
is limited, the process of arbitrage allows products to reach the consumers who
value them most. As put by Schwartz, “uniform pricing allocates a given total output
optimally (it leaves no unexploited gains from reshuffling output between markets),
while discriminatory pricing in general will induce misallocations by distorting
consumers’ choices.”74
Nevertheless, often such resale markets do not form and do not correct against
personalized pricing. To understand why, this article starts with the theory of these
markets. Like any sale of property, resale transactions shift property from low- to
high-value uses.75 For a transaction to be achieved, the resold products must have
a high enough value for the consumer (or she will not buy it), a low enough value to
the seller (or he will not sell it), and transaction costs that do not exceed the
difference in values.76
E-commerce generally supports the development of active resale markets. As
discussed above, e-commerce generally encourages the development of
competitive markets typically by reducing search costs, transaction costs, and
information asymmetries. To focus on the reduction in search costs, an important
aspect of e-commerce is it’s ability to match remote consumers with occasional
remote sellers, thereby increasing the likelihood of distributed resale trade—in

71. Cayseele, supra note 65, at 75; Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation? 85, 978-81 Colum. L. REV.
970 (1985).
72. Anderson & Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 24, 41-42; Cayseele, supra note 65, at 75.
73. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 1, at 86-87.
74. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1259.
75. See Cayseele, supra note 65, at 78-79.
76. Epstein, supra note 71, at 827.
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which private consumers purchase from other equally private market players who
previously bought the product.77
Indeed, even in e-commerce, resale markets are more likely to form in some
cases than in others: in thick markets (with many sellers and buyers), with reduced
transaction costs (e.g., lower shipment costs), when resold products are more
homogenous,78 when information asymmetries are lower, 79 or when the product is
more durable.80 At times, resale may be prohibited by law (e.g., guns, liquor, or
narcotics,81 or due to IP rights protection from resale).82 The result of these features
limiting the creation of resale markets is that some products are less likely to be
resold. In contrast, reservations for a service (e.g., a vacation, seats in the theater)
or small durable products (e.g., books) are ideal candidates for highly distributed
resale markets (e.g., eBay).
So, if these markets are possible, why, for so many products and services, are
there no active distributed resale markets that restore, at least to some extent,
single market price? The next section suggests an answer: their absence is due to
vertical restraints, imposed by the original sellers.
C. Vertical Restraints That Prevent Price Convergence
As explained above, many factors may discourage the creation of a product’s
resale market. While some factors derive from product features or market
conditions, vertical restraints are barriers to the creation of resale markets that
derive from sellers’ active efforts to eliminate resale. This article focuses on these
restraints and particularly on vertical restraints that are designed to sustain
personalized pricing, when the sole alleged justification for the restraint is to
prevent price convergence that will counter the discrimination in price.
1. An Outline of Such Restraints
To eliminate resale trade, sellers must create a product value that can only be
given to the consumers buying from the original seller, ensuring that it is not

77. Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More 15-16, 22, 87
(Hyperion, 2006).
78. Heterogeneity of resale products may be increased due to consumers’ different “first hand” use of the
products – e.g., reduced value of cars with increased mileage. See Fraiberger & Sundararajan, supra note 58.
79. See generally Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An
Economic Approach, 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 45 (2010); Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change., 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 54143 (2014); Gal, supra note 58; Schor, supra note 58, at 8.
80. Cayseele, supra note 65, at 78-79.
81. Epstein, supra note 71, at 973-78.
82. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective,
66 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487 (2010).
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transferable to any consumer rebuying it in the resale market. 83 As will be further
detailed bellow, the primary seller may achieve such a decrease in resale product
value either by using an explicit contractual restriction or by personalizing the
product sold.
The textbook example of explicit contractual non-transferability restraints is
airline tickets. Airline tickets are often named, and the airline does not honor their
use by another passenger. If a consumer does not want to take the flight, her only
recourse is to return the tickets to the airline (often for a considerable cancelation
fee).
The restriction over airplane ticket transferability is commonly justified by
security reasons, a justification contested by some.84 Although contested, this
vertical restriction of transferability has never been challenged in courts as an
antitrust offense (although it is described by Bernasek and Mongan as a “low
hanging fruit” for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to pick). 85 Whether justified
or not, it is clear that this restriction has a straightforward effect of preserving price
discrimination in the markets. This article will explain why.
Commercial flights are often sold by digital merchants that act as online travel
agencies (e.g., Expedia, Orbitz, Travelocity, Booking.com, eDreams) by matching
airlines to potential consumers. These merchants micro-segment passengers and
estimate the value each passenger attaches to an airline ticket based on numerous
parameters collected about the user, such as: advanced or last minute purchase,
number of tickets purchased, overall trip plans including preferable connections,
the general and concrete purpose of the flight, or the resources the consumer will
use to fund it. They then use these segmentations to price discriminate: two
consumers can be offered similar seats on the same flight with the same terms for
a substantially different price.86
One could expect a developed online resale market in this industry, which would
mitigate price discrimination. After all, commercial flight tickets live up to most of
the factors supporting resale markets. To start, these markets are relatively
homogenous, since in each flight, many seats have incremental (if any) difference
from other seats (same passengers’ class, closely positioned in the plane, etc).
Second, air-tickets are durable products that do not lose their value up until the
flight takes place. Third, air-transportation markets are often thick (at least in
83.

Epstein, supra note 71, at 972.
In essence, the concern is of unknown passengers logging with fake identities into the airplane;
however, it is unclear how a restriction in the preliminary step of tickets purchase eliminates that concern.
Moreover, several steps can mitigate the security concerns, e.g., allowing the resell only up until one month
before the flight, or demanding the secondary consumer to make a symbolic credit-card deposit to prove she
has a valid bank account in a friendly country. More about the debate regarding this security concern. Bernasek
& Mongan, supra note 2, at 126-29.
85. Id. at 129.
86. Id. at 126-29; Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 1, at 107-08.
84.
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popular routes, connecting big cities). Fourth, transaction costs of an e-ticket are
low. Finally, with suitable digital intermediaries, search costs and information
asymmetries are minimized. In particular, information about flight schedule, prices
and services is affluent online, and most security and safety standards are so closely
regulated that concern of information asymmetry is mitigated. 87 Nevertheless, in
the e-tickets market, there is no viable resale market and no arbitrage process to
prices. The reason is the contractual restrictions of transferability that prevent the
creation of one.
In addition to explicit contractual restraints of resale, sellers may also take
actions in the production or marketing process to indirectly limit the resale of
products. Such steps may include personalizing the exterior design, 88 limiting the
product warranty terms or replacements,89 or customizing the entire product
proposition to the particular consumer (e.g., by offering personalized financial
products, such as loans and insurance policies,90 or by creating a bundle of products
that only fits one consumer and that can hardly be sold separately). Any such step,
if appropriately tailored, can limit the transfer of the product, thereby preventing
the formation of resale markets and preserving personalized prices.
To be sure any adjustment of the product to the consumer will have a somewhat
limiting effect on the product’s transferability, but not all, adjustments will have to
have the anticompetitive effect of restraining trade. The restraining effect is
derived, inter alia, from the market conditions (in an otherwise competitive market,
the effect may be negligible) and from the level of specificity of the personalization
(if the product is tailored to fit an individual consumer, a handful of consumers, or
a more substantial market share).91
Again, even if there is an anticompetitive effect, the seller may have
procompetitive justifications for this product customization, which may serve as a
defense against antitrust liability. The typical justification for product customization

87. See Blickstein Shchory, supra note 60; Michael C. Mineiro, Law and Regulation Governing U.S.
Commercial Spaceports: Licensing, Liability, and Legal Challenges 73 J. Air & L. Commerce 759 (2008); OMRI BENSHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE, 5 (PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014).
88. For a long list of customized products, see BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 96-104, 164-166; The
list includes: customized information websites (different content to different users), customized food and drinks
like muesli and tea, customized suits, customized gift baskets, etc. The technological development of 3D
printers is about to take the customization abilities another step forward. Id. at 104-07; See also Michal S. Gal,
3D Challenges: Ensuring Competition and Innovation in 3D Printing, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 36 (2019).
89. Anderson & Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 14; 18-19; Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. &
ECON. 143, 147 (1972); Michael Waldman, Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 131
(2003).
90. See BERNARD MARR, BIG DATA IN PRACTICE: HOW 45 SUCCESSFUL COMPANIES USED BIG DATA ANALYTICS TO DELIVER
EXTRAORDINARY RESULTS 81-87, 217-21 (Wiley, 2016).
91. BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 108-11.
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is the creation of a broader variety of products and the expansion of consumer
choice.92 For example, a consumer may want to purchase a self-portrait and not a
more generally appreciated piece of art. In these cases, despite anticompetitive
effects, product customization can be competitively justified and therefore is
properly protected by the law.
In e-commerce, both explicit restraints of transferability and product
customization are becoming even more common. Among other reasons for the
increase of prevalence, technological developments allow sellers to design product
propositions that confuse sellers. If consumers cannot thoroughly read the
contracts they click to agree to, cannot compare them, and cannot truly negotiate
their terms, they are prone to agree to personalized contracts that inadequately
limit the transferability of the products.93 Furthermore, the literature has identified
several manners in which consumers’ ability to accurately assess online information
has been harmed, including the overload of information accumulated from various
sources, the increase of distractions, the increase of “push” information, the loss of
experienced selling agents, and uncertainty as to the applicable law. 94 Additionally,
technological developments cause an increase in the customization of products,
which leads to unprecedented product diversity. 95 Such diversity makes the
comparison of product propositions and product prices (let alone transferability)
difficult.96
Not all cases in which firms both impose vertical restraints and exercise
personalized pricing raise such a concern. To take the example from the
introduction, a restriction of transferability of the rental lease toward young drivers
may not prevent Professor B from transferring the rental lease to Professor A—or
at least it does so only randomly. It is only when both product price and vertical
restriction are directly tied to each other, and justified by the same attempt to price
discriminate, that the concern in the center of this article arises. For such an
example, consider the option that rental contracts limit the transferability to
anyone who received a higher pricing offer. This article argues that such a
restriction supports personalized pricing but undermines its procompetitive effects.
The next section turns to analyze the competitive effects of such restrictions.

92. Id.; see Jack S. Hu, Evolving Paradigms of Manufacturing: from Mass Production to Mass Customization
and Personalization, 7 PROCEDIA CIRP, 3, 3, 5 (2013).
93. PATTERSON, supra note 16, at 146- 62.
94. Shchory, supra note 60, at 13-15; BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 114-39.
95. DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THE ORGANIZED MIND: THINKING STRAIGHT IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION OVERLOAD, 5 (Dutton
2014).
96. BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 2, at 92-113.
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2. Effects over Competition
The basic intuition suggests that when re-trade pushes toward price
convergence, it does so by adding trade rather than reducing it, and this stimulation
of competition is supposed to increase consumer welfare. This intuition was also
stated by Gifford and Kudrle, who noted that “arbitrage would route the goods
involved to their highest valued users, thereby eliminating an inefficiency
connected with discrimination and increasing welfare.” 97 To see how such
additional trade takes place in a market in which output is already high (although
not unlimited), the article describes three potential market dynamics.
First, it is assumed that people buy products they later find out they do not need.
This could be because of a change of circumstances or a change in their preferences
or could be the result of honest, inevitable mistakes. This article argues that in such
occurrences, since product is not held by those who value it the most, there is an
economic interest in allowing consumers to resell the product purchased. Limiting
such resale forces people to hold products they do not want, i.e., the product will
be held not by those who value it the most. Assuming that sellers are not always
willing to accept a return of the product resold and it is unnecessarily efficient to
force them to do so, the limit of resale reduces welfare.
Second, it is assumed that the technology of personalized pricing has not yet
perfected to the level of “perfect” “first degree” discrimination. For example,
people who have low online presence or are better at protecting their privacy will
be harder to track and will not create sufficient data for their segmentation.
Alternatively, limited analysis tools will lead to mistakes in consumer segmentation
and discrimination. The ability of end consumers to re-trade allows the transfer of
the product to consumers who value it more and, therefore, leads to an increased
aggregate welfare.
Third, it is assumed that personalized pricing only discriminates within a limited
group of consumers and leaves others with no access to discounted deals (e.g.,
older people or poor people who have no online presence). 98 As long as
personalized pricing cannot reach the entire population, allowing resale
presumably has a complementary effect of increasing opportunities to purchase to
those unreachable by the firm exercising price discrimination.
As these three market dynamics demonstrate, if firms are allowed to impose
vertical restraints along with their personalized pricing practices, consumer welfare
is harmed. Recall that the article focuses on vertical restraints, when the sole
alleged justification for the restraint is to prevent price convergence that will
counter the discrimination in price. Since vertical restraints, as demonstrated, have

97.
98.

Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1243.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 29, 27 n. 148.
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anticompetitive effects, policy makers must consider whether the justification of
sustaining price discrimination outweighs potential harm to competition.
To begin with, as the examples above demonstrate, an arbitrage process
compliments, rather than overrides, personalized pricing. So, if the real purpose is
to increase output and purchase opportunities to more consumers, then policy
makers should support more trade, rather than a limitation of trade. Indeed, price
convergence could potentially reduce incentives to invest in big data and pursue
personalized pricing. However, as noted, the law of one price is only an “attractor
equilibrium,” inclining markets toward price convergence. Accordingly, even if
vertical restraints will be allowed, price discrimination will not completely diminish,
and incentives will not fade. Moreover, as data collection and analysis are
developing and becoming ever more prominent, such investment may be less
expensive and incentives to pursue it less fragile. Therefore, permitting vertical
restraints only to preserve personalized pricing’s incentives, which are expected to
survive albeit the re-trade they limit, seems unnecessary.
As a result, this article points to a concern that vertical restraints designed to
sustain personalized pricing harm competition, with no actual benefit to
consumers. The next part turns to the insufficient existing law and the part that
follows proposes a solution to this insufficiency.
III. The Existing Law Regarding Personalized Pricing and Vertical
Restraints

In light of how vertical restraints support personalized pricing, it is valuable to
consider existing law regarding both of these practices. The Robinson-Patman Act
of 1936, which explicitly prohibits discrimination in price, and section 1 of the
Sherman Act of 1890, which explicitly prohibits restraints on trade, including those
vertically imposed.
A. Price Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act of 193699 explicitly bans differential pricing. 100
Although its language prohibits difference in prices, the act continues by allowing a
firm to differentiate in price because of differences in costs.101 Additionally, a prima
99. Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012)).
100. Subsection (a) “Price; Selection of Customers.”: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality… where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce…”. Id.
101. By doing so, the law aligns with the economic approach that acknowledges discrimination only when
prices bear different ratios to their marginal costs: “[p]rovided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
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facie claim of price discrimination can be rebutted by proving that price was set “in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.” 102 By adopting these
provisions, the law protects sellers who differentiate in price because of sound
business justifications.
The language of the act explicitly limits the prohibition to “where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.”103 This limitation is usually interpreted to apply
either against a “primary line” or against a “secondary line” injury. 104 A “primary
line” injury occurs when the producer reduces prices in a designated market,
thereby causing injury to competitors in that market. 105 A “secondary line” injury
occurs when some consumers are given a price advantage over other consumers so
that the injury is at the purchaser’s level. 106 In contrast, traditionally, the law is not
applied to buyers who are end consumers; it is assumed that because end
consumers are not links in the supply chain, they do not compete with one another
and, therefore, no harm will be caused to competition. 107 However, this general
approach overlooks the potential resale markets that may take place after the
purchase by individual consumers and that such resale may turn these end
consumers into competitors in the market. 108 For the sake of this article, which
emphasizes the procompetitive effects of these resale markets, it is assumed that
despite the unprecedented use of the Robinson-Patman Act in such circumstances,
the law could be applied to individual consumers too, if they are potential resellers.

resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered.” Id.; See also Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1239-40.
102. Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, supra note 101, §13 (b).
103. Id. §13(a).
104. Price Discrimination: Robinson-Patman Violations, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/price-discrimination-robinson-patman (last visited Nov. 10,
2021).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Edwards, supra note 21, at 580.
108. Li Xi v. Apple Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y, 2009) (“Plaintiffs assert that they were injured
because they could not resell their iPhones for as high a profit as later purchasers. However, plaintiffs do not
allege that they are competitors engaged in the business of reselling iPhones, that they are in actual competition
with a favored purchaser, or that they even resold or attempted to resell their iPhones…. Thus, plaintiffs fail to
allege actual competition with a favored purchaser or antitrust injury”).
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Shortly after its enactment, the Robinson-Patman Act was well enforced,109 and
the Supreme Court affirmed it both in primary line110 and in secondary line111 cases.
Beginning in the 1970s, the Chicago school of economic thought, which greatly
influenced antitrust policy, 112 criticized enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act
for preserving the existence of inefficient competitors who cannot compete with
lower prices rather than promoting competition in price and product variety. 113 In
accordance with this criticism, since the 1970s, Robinson-Patman enforcement
sharply declined,114 and there have even been (failed) attempts to repeal the act.115
However, Robinson-Patman prevailed, and its weary enforcement continued, 116
accompanied by private suits that continued to be brought. 117 These cases enabled
the Supreme Court, in two signature decisions, to narrow the application of the Act.
The first case was Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. of
1993.118 In its decision, the Court clarified that the Robinson-Patman Act’s
requirement to have an anticompetitive effect must be interpreted in light of other
antitrust policies.119 In particular, the primary line Robinson-Patman claim against
predatory pricing must meet the standard required under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.120 For claims against a competitor applying a predatory pricing scheme, the
plaintiff should prove that the scheme was designed to exclude competition,
thereby seeking to monopolize the market, acquire control over market prices, and
109. Empirical evidence shows that this act was enforced by the FTC since shortly after its enactment, with
a peak of enforcement during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in 1961-1968. See D. Daniel Sokol,
Analyzing Robinson-Pattman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064, 2072-74 (2015).
110. Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). In this case, Utah Pie, which owned two-thirds
of the Salt Lake City market share, sued national pie producers who had cut the frozen pie prices in Salt Lake
City to become stronger in that market. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Utah Pie, prohibiting a locationbased discount.
111. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the FTC’s ceaseand-desist order against Morton Salt, which prohibited a quantity discount that was only given to five
wholesalers, enabling them to profitably resale to smaller retailers.
112. KWOKA & WHITE, supra note 8, at 8-9
113. ELEANOR FOX & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW 110 (Thomson Reuters ed.,
2010).
114. Sokol, supra note 111, at 2072-74.
115. Repealing this act was recommended in four separate bipartisan reports to Congress (1955, 1969, 1977
and 2007). See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS i, iii (2007)
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/letter_to_president.pdf.
116. Sokol, supra note 111, at 2066-67.
117. Sokol, supra note 111, at 2083-84.
118. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, (1993). In this case, Liggett and
Brown & Williamson entered a price war in the cigarette market. At some point, Brown & Williamson sold its
branded cigarettes to wholesalers at a loss, so Liggett filed a suit, arguing that Brown & Williamson’s discounts
to wholesalers were in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 212-17.
119. Id. at 220.
120. Id. at 221.
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recoup losses.121 In Brooke Group, no such theory of harm was demonstrated. 122
Instead, the Court noted that the alleged predatory pricing scheme reduced prices
and increased output in the markets,123 the exact procompetitive effect that is
typically set forth in favor of price discrimination.
In 2006, in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.,124 the
Supreme Court expanded this approach toward secondary line discrimination cases
by ruling for appellant Volvo, which argued that its dealer Reeder-Simco could not
make a secondary line Robinson-Patman claim unless it proved that price
discrimination caused harm to competition. 125 In its briefs, Volvo emphasized that,
in fact, price discrimination was designed to attract business with different
consumer groups, i.e., increase output.126 The Court did not make a full analysis of
anticompetitive effects versus procompetitive effects and instead explained that its
decision not to extend Robinson-Patman’s governance to the circumstances of the
case construes the Act “consistently with broader policies of the antitrust laws.” 127
The result of this historic development is that while the Robinson-Patman Act
survived the 1970s shift of approach, it was limited to resemble the Sherman Act’s
prohibition of monopolization.128 Neither in Brook Group nor in Volvo Trucks did the
Court explain how, under that interpretation of the law, the Robinson-Patman Act
differs from the Sherman Act’s prohibition of monopolization or, alternatively, why
two laws pursue the exact same goal. 129 One way or another, today the RobinsonPatman Act is almost never successful in restricting price discrimination beyond the
prohibition of monopolization, and its main influence is the imposition of high
litigation costs.130 A review of the scholarship of the time131 and the arguments
121.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 219.
123. Id. at 233.
124. 546 U.S. 164 (2006).
125. See Brief for Petitioner at 42, Volvo Trucks N. Am, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006)
(No. 04-905) (arguing that “Reeder offered no explanation of how Volvo could possibly benefit by reducing the
competitiveness of its dealers”).
126. In Volvo’s words, “The price differential in such circumstances may simply reflect the fact that the
manufacturer has less reason to offer price concessions to attract the business of certain retail customers –
perhaps because sales to those customers are likely without discounts or because they provide less value to
the manufacturer – and that the “disfavored” dealer’s sales efforts are disproportionately focused on those
retail customers.” Id.; “Conversely, larger discounts may be a way for the manufacturer to encourage more
intensive efforts by its dealer to sell to other retail customers, who would otherwise turn to a different
manufacturer’s products or who are particularly valuable customers.” Id.
127. See Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 180-81.
128. Woodcock, supra note 9, at 1375-79.
129. See Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 187-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s interpretation
overlooked Congress’ intention to protect small retailers from price discrimination).
130. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1271.
131. See supra notes 129-30; see also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
122.
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brought to court in Volvo Trucks132 demonstrate that this shift was meant to protect
the procompetitive effect that price discrimination has on the increase of output
and consumer welfare.
Importantly, in the brick-and-mortar settings in which the Brook Group and Volvo
Trucks cases took place, immediate distributive effects could be overlooked as long
as market power was not illegally created, because market forces could be expected
to correct such distributional problems.133 Even if it is assumed that Sherman Act’s
prohibitions are successful in completely eliminating market power (an assumption
problematic on its own),134 in the online personalized pricing setting, this reliance
on market forces is no longer enough. This is because firms that hold even slight,
incremental market power and that attempt to acquire none can use data power to
induce sales and capture more of the consumer surplus. As a result, the antitrust
law’s focus on market power is ill-suited to restrict price discrimination in the form
of personalized pricing in the long run.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Robinson-Patman Act as currently interpreted is
ill-suited to personalized pricing does not mean it should be amended. After all, as
described in Section II.A, personalized pricing has potential positive effects over
aggregate welfare, but clear negative effects over the narrower standard of
consumer welfare. Since courts’ use of the term “consumer welfare” is ambiguous
and often attributed to either of the standards,135 and since scholars still debate
which standard is better, there is uncertainty as to whether the Robinson-Patman
Act, as interpreted today, should be repealed, remanded, otherwise reinforced, or
left as is.136 The prevalence of personalized pricing, as such, may require an
affirmative decision as to the appropriate standard under which antitrust law takes
place.137 This article leaves this query open. It is sufficient to note that Robinson-

132. In its briefs, Volvo argued that “Reeder offered no explanation of how Volvo could possibly benefit by
reducing the competitiveness of its dealers,” and claimed that in fact price discrimination was designed to
attract business with different consumer groups. Brief for Petitioner at 42, Volvo Trucks N. Am, Inc. v. ReederSimco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) (No. 04-905); In Volvo’s words, “The price differential in such
circumstances may simply reflect the fact that the manufacturer has less reason to offer price concessions to
attract the business of certain retail customers – perhaps because sales to those customers are likely without
discounts or because they provide less value to the manufacturer – and that the ‘disfavored’ dealer’s sales
efforts are disproportionately focused on those retail customers. Id.; Conversely, larger discounts may be a way
for the manufacturer to encourage more intensive efforts by its dealer to sell to other retail customers, who
would otherwise turn to a different manufacturer’s products or who are particularly valuable customers.” Id.
133. See supra Section II.B.
134. Woodcock, supra note 9, at 1375-79.
135. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1260.
136. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 4, at 1252 (arguing that “[t]he law should view the possibility of harm
from price discrimination with greater skepticism than it currently does”); Mehra, supra note 17, at 210-11
(calling to reuse antidiscrimination law); and Sokol, supra note 111, at 2064-65 (condemning the use of the
Robinson Patman Act).
137. Woodcock, supra note 9, at 1375-79.
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Patman, as currently interpreted, allows price discrimination because it embraces
the potential procompetitive effects it can bring.
B. Vertical Restraints and the Sherman Act
The second relevant piece of existing law, the Sherman Act, is relevant for
understanding the legal prohibition of vertical restraints. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act forbids restraints of trade, as such.138 Ever since the early days of the act, courts
engaged with the question of the standard according to which the prohibition over
restrictive arrangements should be litigated: whether the standard is a per se rule
or rule of reason.
Per se illegality means that the conduct is intrinsically prohibited under each and
every circumstance regardless of any possible business justifications. 139 The rule of
reason standard means that the court is required to conduct a detailed market
assessment before deciding the legality of the restriction. 140 To establish a rule of
reason case, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant has market power
and that the defendant imposed an anticompetitive restraint. 141 To alleviate this
burden, the plaintiff is typically required to provide expert testimony identifying the
market, pointing to market power, and supplying an anticompetitive effect
theory.142 The high litigation costs of the rule of reason are accompanied with high
costs of detection and, just like simplistic rules, may increase error costs.143 If the
plaintiff succeeds in showing a prima facie anticompetitive harm, the burden shifts
to the defendant to show a procompetitive justification. If that burden is met by the
defendant, then the plaintiff can show that a less restrictive alternative could
achieve the same ends. If no such less restrictive alternative is provided, then the
court will balance between the anticompetitive and the procompetitive effects to
decide whether the restriction is legal.144 The problem with the rule of reason
standard is that it leads to uncertainty, creates confusion in courts and in

138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (declaring that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is . . . illegal”).
139. Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 83.
140. Id.
141. Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 101-02.
142. Id. at 98.
143. Id. at 98-99.
144. Id. at 103-04.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

77

Shchory (DO NOT DELETE)

8/30/2022 3:55 PM

Price Discrimination “Just For You”
practice,145 increases litigation costs,146 and reduces enforcement.147 The key
benefit of the shift from a per se rule to the rule of reason is that it enabled courts
to weigh the procompetitive effects that vertical agreements can have against the
anticompetitive effects they cause, thus preventing unwarranted intervention with
free markets when these arrangements contribute to competition. 148
One of the key factors in courts’ selection of the standard applied over the
restrictive arrangement is its type: whether it is horizontal (between competitors)
or vertical (between consecutive chains in the distribution channel).149 Originally,
both horizontal and vertical cases were judged under the per se standard. 150 This
analogous approach cracked early on, when the Supreme Court exempted precontract resale price restraints from that rule, stating that a supplier can decide,
before entering a contract, not to sell to a distributor that charges less than the
supplier’s required price.151 In 1963, the Supreme Court held that vertical price
restrictions were indeed illegal per se but that the illegality of other vertical
restrictions would only be decided after considering the justification at trial 152—that
is, a rule of reason. Four years later, in 1967, the Supreme Court stepped back from
this tolerance, finding that vertical territorial restraints were illegal per se,153 just
like horizontal territorial agreements.154

145. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision,
45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1977).
146. See Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 98; See also Note, Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in Circumstance”:
The Internet and Resale Price Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1600 , 1611-12 (2008) [hereinafter Leegin’s
Unexplored “Change of Circumstances”]; See also Note, Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in Circumstance”: The
Internet and Resale Price Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1600 , 1611-12 (2008) [hereinafter Leegin’s Unexplored
“Change of Circumstances”].
147. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 915 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 103-04; FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS
AMONG
COMPETITORS
3
(2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrustguidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf.
149. Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 86.
150. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 385, 404 (1911) (noting that vertical price
restraint was originally judged under the per se rule), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927) (discussing
how horizontal price restraint was previously judged under the per se rule); See also Flynn et al., supra note 34,
at 635-36.
151. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 304, 306 (1919).
152. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
153. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967) (noting that per se violations of
the Sherman Act included “the control over the resale of Schwinn’s products after Schwinn has parted with
ownership thereof[,] and the effort[] thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the product may be
transferred”).
154. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
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After years of ambiguity, in 1977, the Supreme Court returned to the question
of standard in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.155 In this case, the Court
rejected the per se rule against vertical non-price restraints, applying the traditional
rule of reason standard.156 At the same time, the Court declined to overrule the per
se rule for vertical price restraints, stating in a footnote that unlike other vertical
restraints, the approach toward vertical price restraints is firmly established in
antitrust law.157
The footnote distinguishing between price and non-price vertical restraints drew
much criticism,158 until it was finally reversed in 2007 with Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,159 which held that vertical price agreements are no
longer per se illegal and that from now on they would be reviewed under the rule
of reason.160 In this context, it is important to note that while the rule of reason
standard was adopted for all vertical agreements, it was not adopted for horizontal
price agreements161 or for horizontal agreements aiming to boycott a competitor. 162
The switch from the per se rule to the rule of reason in all vertical restraint cases
required some justification. The fundamental argument supporting that switch is
that while vertical restraints do reduce intra-brand competition by limiting the
number of distributors competing for a group of customers (limiting the number of
sellers for the same brand), these restraints increase inter-brand competition by
allowing the manufacturer to achieve efficient product distribution (so brands
compete among themselves in their distribution to the consumer). 163 The Court in
both GTE Sylvania and Leegin expressed a concern that without vertical
agreements, businesses would face an increased free-riding problem, in which
discount vendors would steal customers from more expensive vendors who invest
in advertising, customer education, and brand reputation.164 Therefore, the Court
155.

433 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977).
Id. at 58.
157. Id. at 51 n.18.
158. See Leegin’s Unexplored “Change In Circumstance”, supra note 148, at 1602-03.
159. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007).
160. Id. at 899.
161. Horizontal price agreements had remained prohibited since early days. See United States v. Trenton
Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 398-400 (1927); Daniel B. Nixa, Note, Internet Retailers and Intertype Competition: How
the Supreme Court’s Incomplete Analysis in Leegin v. PSKS Leaves Lower Courts Improperly Equipped to Consider
Modern Resale Price Maintenance Agreements, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 461, 478 (2009).
162. Horizontal agreements aiming to boycott a direct competitor have also remained prohibited since early
days. See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998); See also MM Steel L.P v. JSW Steel (USA) Inc.
806 F.3d 835, 848-49 (2015).
163. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1977); Gregory T. Gundlach & Riley T. Krotz,
Resale Price Maintenance: Implications of Marketing Trends for the Colgate Doctrine and the Leegin Factors, 39
J. PUB. POL’Y. & MKTG. 48, 52 (2020); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889-91 (2007).
164. Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 54-55; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 913-14 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
156.
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was concerned that without vertical arrangements, the competition over better
distribution would be impossible.165 It therefore adopted a more tailored standard
of illegality toward such agreements.
A close look at the GTE Sylvania and Leegin cases reveals that the brick-and
mortar-setting in which they take place is fundamentally different from the online
setting in which vertical restraints that sustain personalized pricing take place.
There are four reasons that contribute to this difference.
First, neither GTE Sylvania nor Leegin involved restraints that were designed to
sustain personalized pricing, and they had nothing to do with the Robinson-Patman
Act. Accordingly, the Court did not consider the question whether the
procompetitive effects of price discrimination, as such, deserve two floors of judicial
protection: first, in surviving the Robinson-Patman prohibition of differentiated
pricing; and second, in justifying a more tolerant approach toward vertical restraints
that protect personalized pricing. The Court never analyzed the anti-competitive
effects of such restraints, which, as noted in Section II.C.1, have anticompetitive
effects and cannot be justified solely to protect personalized pricing.
Second, because e-commerce offers an increased variety of product brands and
abundant selling platforms, the intra-brand and inter-brand competition takes
place simultaneously. This simultaneous competition, in which different types of
firms compete in different distribution channels, is called inter-type competition. 166
The decisions in GTE Sylvania and Leegin take into account the need to balance
inter-brand and intra-brand competition,167 but they overlook the inter-type
competition prevalent in e-commerce.168 In e-commerce resale, on which this
article focuses, trade can take place simultaneously by primary market players and
end consumers in various platforms that serve as distribution channels—that is,
inter-type competition. The restrictions of transferability, as presented in Section
II.C have a destructive effect over such inter-type trade, which the court—
considering inter-brand and intra-brand competition alone—did not consider.
Third, the precedents were set in the context of restrictions imposed between
the producer and the distributor.169 This article looks at the restriction imposed in
a different relationship: the seller and the end consumer, who may (or may not)

165. Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 54-56; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 913-14 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
166. Daniel B. Nixa, Note, Internet Retailers and Intertype Competition: How the Supreme Court’s Incomplete
Analysis in Leegin v. PSKS Leaves Lower Courts Improperly Equipped to Consider Modern Resale Price
Maintenance Agreements, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 461, 478-79 (2009).
167. Id. at 483-84.
168. Id. at 486-88.
169. See Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 37-38 (noting that the restriction was imposed by a television
manufacturer over its retailers); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882-83 (noting that the restriction was imposed by a leather
manufacturer over its retailers).
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decide, later on, to re-trade.170 Indeed, because of the potential resale by an end
consumer, an end consumer may be analyzed as a distributor, raising concerns,
such as potential damage for the original seller’s reputation, if the end consumer
resells a used product with impaired qualities. However, if resale markets are
sufficiently identified as such, the concerns for the original seller’s reputation are
mitigated. Accordingly, limitations over such a resale are less justified.
Finally, the Court in Leegin commented that restrictions imposed by entities with
no market power are unlikely to have an anticompetitive purpose.171 However, the
concept of power, as has been so far analyzed in antitrust laws, does not capture
the ability of firms holding data power to exercise personalized pricing.
In sum, when courts imposed the rule of reason standard over all vertical
restraints, they did not consider the particular circumstances of online vertical
restraints that are designed to sustain personalized pricing. The blanket tolerance
toward vertical restraints is not sensitive to the individualized harm to competition
entrenched in these agreements.
VI. Proposal: Changing the Judicial Standard of Review

The above review of existing law shows how Congress explicitly prohibited the
practices of price discrimination and vertical restraints and how, under the
influence of the Chicago school of economic theory, courts adopted a tolerant
approach, permitting price discrimination almost altogether and applying the rule
of reason standard over all vertical restraints, making them difficult to litigate. This
article claimed that vertical restraints that are designed to sustain personalized
pricing do not deserve such tolerance, and this part aims to fix the problem by
making policy recommendations to increase their scrutiny.
The starting point is the Leegin decision, which was, as described in the previous
part, the last time that the Supreme Court considered the appropriate rule to be
applied to vertical restraints.172 Importantly, in that decision, the Court was aware
that the shift from per se illegality to a rule of reason analysis might create
confusion, deter potential plaintiffs, and reduce enforcement. 173 It therefore
indicated that over time, courts can develop presumptions, which shift the burden
of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant, thereby taking an intermediate position
between the per se rule and the rule of reason. 174
This article suggests that vertical arrangements that are designed to sustain
personalized pricing are exactly the type of cases in which the litigation process

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Brooke Group v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219, 233 (1993).
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898.
See Gundlach & Krotz, supra note 165, at 48-54.
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 915 (Breyers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 898-99.
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should be re-structured to relieve the high burden of the rule of reason and to
encourage suits.
To do so, this article proposes that in cases of vertical arrangements designed to
sustain personalized pricing, courts should restructure the litigation process by
using a presumption that places the burden “in between” per se and the rule of
reason. To avoid confusion in practice and in litigation, this article suggests that this
shift in approach should be led by the antitrust agencies, declaring this interpretive
standard and creating several “block exemptions,” under which these practices are
protected. The next part reviews the legal background for the proposal, followed
by a delineation of the key features to its application.
A. The Proposed Legal Presumption
Throughout the years of antitrust litigation, it has been proven that the
dichotomous distinction between per se illegality and the rule of reason is
insufficient. In several Supreme Court cases, the Court recognized that while some
restrictions may not fall under the criteria to become per se illegal, they are
nonetheless so bluntly anticompetitive that they do not justify the full, costly rule
of reason analysis.175
To fill the gap between per se and rule of reason, the courts have adopted several
legal tools. The most renowned among them is the “quick look” standard, which in
essence is a shortcut in proving the rule of reason elements and is therefore highly
preferable among plaintiffs.176 An alternative approach to the evidentiary standard
in deciding between per se and rule of reason is the one developed in the
scholarship describing the burden of proof required to condemn restrictive
arrangements as a “sliding scale.”177 As antitrust scholars Areeda and Hovenkamp
explain, there are “numerous variations in proof” that could be applied in antitrust
cases; therefore, one should not conclude “that antitrust analysis is governed by
three discrete silos denominated rule of reason, ‘quick look,’ or ‘per se.’ Rather, the
variations are far too many to permit such a tripartite classification and are best
described as creating a ‘sliding scale’ of antitrust analysis.” 178 The “sliding scale”
analysis suggested by them was quoted by the majority in California Dental Ass’n v.
Federal Trade Commission,179 noting that “the quality of proof required should vary
with the circumstances.”180 Basically, the “sliding scale” is not a standard of its own,

175. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117, 119 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
176. Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 102, 122-23.
177. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶ 1508 (5th ed. 2021).
178. Id.
179. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999).
180. Id.
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nor is it a new methodology to examine antitrust cases. Rather, this scale includes
a range of legal rules, including “instantaneous balancing, ‘facial’ judgments, and
categorical or presumptive propositions.”181
By adopting an intermediate standard, either “quick look” or any other standard
in the “sliding scale,” the court can increase enforcement against an unwarranted
practice and yet allow procompetitive effects, if relevant, to be heard.182 This article
argues that vertical restraints designed to sustain personalized pricing should be
reviewed under such an intermediate standard. Using such an intermediate
standard will address the concerns of unjustified harm to competition but, at the
same time, attend to the development in law, respect the tradition already
developed regarding vertical restraints, and ensure that the ideology and
economics underlying these developments are not outweighed.
The first problem with the proposal to adopt such an intermediate standard for
vertical agreements is the lack of precedent supporting the use of such a standard.
To be sure, while the “quick look” standard has been recognized in theory in three
Supreme Court cases, the Court, under the facts of each case, rejected it. 183
Accordingly, such litigation shortcuts have not penetrated well into antitrust
practice and have generally been abandoned by lower courts.184 One extraordinary
exception is Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.185 In this case, the
FTC used the term “inherently suspect” regarding a practice that was found to be
of a “close family resemblance” to “another practice that already stands convicted
in the court of consumer welfare.”186 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the FTC’s use of an
intermediate standard, stating that “if, based upon economic learning and the
experience of the market, it is obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs
competition, then the restraint is presumed unlawful,” and the burden shifts to the
defendant to rebut.187 The court also applauded the FTC’s use of this standard,
stating that “the Commission appears to acknowledge, as it must, that as economic
learning and market experience evolve, so too will the class of restraints subject to
summary adjudication.”188 This article considers this court’s comment as an open

181.

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 179, ¶ 1508.
Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 122-28.
183. Id. at 123; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 179, ¶ 1508; The most notable example of such a ruling is
that of Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, in which the majority stated that arrangements can be condemned with no
detailed market assessment, where “an observer with even rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question have anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.” 526 U.S.
at 769-70; However, in the specific circumstances of the case, just like in other Supreme Court examples, the
court found that the FTC failed to convince the court to review its case under the “quick look” doctrine. Id.
184. Edward D. Cavanagh, Whatever Happened To Quick Look?, 26 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 39, 40, 67 (2017).
185. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
186. Id. at 36-37.
187. Id. at 36.
188. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
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invitation for governmental agencies responsible for antitrust enforcement to
structure more of the litigation process.
A second hurdle in adopting an intermediate standard for vertical restraints that
protect personalized pricing arises from the NYNEX Corp. v. Discon case,189 in which
the Supreme Court declared that vertical agreements to boycott a third party can
only be analyzed under the rule of reason standard.190 This statement was later
interpreted by Areeda and Hovenkamp to prevent not only the per se rule but also
the application of a “quick look” or any other intermediate standard for vertical
agreements that lack a horizontal component.191 With all due respect, such an
interpretation was not what the Supreme Court meant, as it never attempted to
analyze the “quick look,” “sliding scale,” or any other intermediate standard for the
circumstances before it. Rather, it focused on the question of per se versus rule of
reason and from those options chose the latter. 192 Moreover, the case had to do
with a non-price vertical restriction, which is fundamentally different from vertical
agreements that are designed to sustain personalized pricing. Additionally, the
NYNEX case was decided in 1998. Back then, the Court could not have imagined the
technologies that would evolve in the coming years, allowing personalized pricing
and new, cutting-edge techniques to impose restraints over trade.193 Because of
these developments, along with their far-reaching effects over the economy (as
described in previous parts), one should not infer from the Court’s comment in
NYNEX any more than what was explicitly in it.
A third challenge is that courts often state that a per se rule should only be for
restraints that courts are familiar with and when they can predict with confidence
that it would be invalidated in the overwhelming majority of instances under the
rule of reason analysis.194 Indeed, this article does not propose a per se rule, which
could be a step too far. The per se rule’s strict approach leaves no room to discuss
procompetitive benefits, and in contrast, the use of a presumption leaves courts
and litigants with some flexibility. Nevertheless, stepping away from the rule of
reason also requires some justification. To that end, while the practices discussed
are relatively new, they are, in essence, a development of practices known and
analyzed for a long period of time: personalized pricing is the descendant of price
discrimination, and online vertical restraints are the descendants of traditional
restriction of transferability. Experience with those well-known ancestors suffices.
189.

Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, (1998).
Id. at 135; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 179, ¶ 1508.
191. Id.
192. See Nynex Corp., 525 U.S. at 136 (noting that precedent “makes the per se rule inapplicable, for the
case before us concerns only a vertical agreement and a vertical restraint, a restraint that takes the form of
depriving a supplier of a potential customer” and “a ‘vertical restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some
agreement on price or price levels.’”).
193. See supra Section II.A; see also supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
194. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007).
190.
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Additionally, although such practices do not date back long, they are common and
growing in frequency every day. With this growing number of events and the
appropriate attention, the experience necessary can be gathered shortly.
Finally, the use of intermediate standards is typically justified when
anticompetitive effects are strong, which triggers the simple, basic intuition that
defendants must also present strong procompetitive effects. 195 Here, the
anticompetitive effect underlying the vertical restraints does not necessarily exceed
the anticompetitive effects of other restraints. Instead, the concern emphasized is
the lack of a procompetitive effect, since, as was argued, competition and not
restriction of competition should complement the procompetitive effects of
personalized pricing. The article argues that in the absence of any meaningful
procompetitive effect, the rule of reason is too tolerant of an approach.
B. Applying the Proposed Presumption
The first step in applying the proposal is defining the intermediate standard to
be used. As noted, an intermediate legal standard could include the “quick look” or
a sliding scale of legal rules, including “instantaneous balancing, ‘facial’ judgments,
and categorical or presumptive propositions.”196 This article proposes a
presumption according to which vertical restraints designed to sustain personalized
pricing will suffice to establish a prima facie anticompetitive harm. Thus, the burden
will shift to the defendant to show a procompetitive justification that exceeds the
desire to protect the pricing scheme. Such legitimate justifications may be social
goals (e.g., encouraging people from otherwise discriminated gender or race) or the
need to adhere to other laws or regulations (e.g., restriction of gun resale). If that
burden is met by the defendant, then litigation proceeds as in traditional rule of
reason cases. The plaintiff should show that a less restrictive alternative could be
used or, if not, ask the court to balance between the anticompetitive and the
procompetitive effects of the restriction. In that final balancing stage, both the
justification acknowledged as unrelated to personalized pricing and those that are
connected to personalized pricing can be considered.
The second step in the proposal is to identify vertical restraints that are designed
to sustain personalized pricing. To do so, this article proposes to seek a correlation
between the pricing scheme and the restriction of transferability. If such a
correlation exists, the restraints are to be identified as designed to sustain the
pricing scheme. Moreover, if such a correlation cannot be said to be significant
enough, and if there is no visible correlation between the restriction and other
justifications, it will also qualify as designed “to sustain personalized pricing” and
invoke the proposed presumption.

195.
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Hovenkamp, supra note 37, at 125.
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To take the example from the introduction, if the restriction of transferability to
the rental lease is applied to contracts in which the price was discounted (banning
the transferability to contracts under regular price), then that direct connection will
suffice for the restriction to qualify as “designed to sustain personalized pricing.”
Moreover, if the restriction is not correlated with the pricing but also cannot be
correlated to another justification, such as the drivers’ driving experience or age,
then the restraint should invoke the intermediate standard. Relatedly, regarding
the tailored air ticket prices, because all contracts in this industry suffer a restriction
of transferability, proving correlation between restriction and the pricing scheme
may be impossible. However, if the restriction of transferability has no correlation
to the usually mentioned security consideration,197 then it should invoke the
presumption.
In antitrust claims, it is the defendant and not the plaintiff who must claim
business justifications. However, the proposal here is based on the need to verify
the lack of correlation between the restriction and the justification before the
defense is invoked. This article suggests that such claims should be invoked by the
defendant in pretrial procedures, before a claim is filed. Such pretrial procedures
should also allow a disclosure stage, in which the plaintiff will be entitled to receive
evidence as to the firm’s pricing practices as well as its use of restraining contracts
or customization of products.
A third step that should be taken—at least until courts and litigants gain
experience with this presumption—to avoid the initial flood of cases and the overlitigation that may allegedly follow, is to acknowledge several block exemptions
from the presumption, under which traditional rule of reason will apply and under
which the burden will remain on the plaintiff:
(-) Personalized prices do not exceed either 10% above or below the median product price –
Personalized pricing that only has a relatively small influence over the average product price
should be considered part of the legitimate discretion of the seller and should therefore be
exempted from the proposed presumption. This exemption is warranted to prevent the initial
focus on cases that lead to relatively mild results over consumer price.
(-) Personalized prices are not used systematically, not based on data collection and analysis,
or not imposed in a pricing scheme that segments the market into very small segments – It is
suggested that personalized pricing that is used occasionally and randomly, which occurs for
a short period of time, or which can be seen as more closely related to “third degree”
discrimination, will not suffice to invoke the presumption. This exemption is warranted to
prevent the initial use of the presumption over traditional pricing schemes, which, as
explained above, have a relatively low influence on market function.
(-) Personalized prices do not rely on market power nor on data power – As previously
discussed, in the age of big data, firms holding data power can exercise personalized pricing
and extract more consumer welfare without holding any dominant market position. It is
therefore recommended to establish that vertical restraints that are tied to personalized
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pricing may be prohibited even without market power as long as the seller holds data power
(i.e., direct or indirect control of consumer data that allows personalized pricing). In contrast,
if the seller holds neither market power nor data power, the presumption should not be
applied.

A fourth point of implementation has to do with the distinction between
contractual restraints and product customization. The article acknowledged that
product customization can be a superior marketing approach and easily justified in
light of expanding consumer choice and increasing product variety. Accordingly,
product customization should invoke the presumption only in particularly
suspicious circumstances, such as substantial correlation occurring between pricing
and customization, personalized prices exceeding more than 30% above or below
median product prices, or a seller having substantial market power and substantial
data power. Courts may also want to distinguish between product customization
that can be justified by the consumer welfare it derives and product customization
that cannot be so justified—and that therefore seems arbitrary. To do so, it may
inquire whether the product price is in any way correlated with the costs of the
production, whether customization of the product adds any substantial value to the
consumer, whether that added value justifies the tailored price, whether the
consumer is allowed to give up the customized features of the product at a
reasonable cost, and so on.
Finally, as a matter of practice, this article suggests that the adoption of this
presumption should be promoted by the antitrust agencies (the FTC and the
Department of Justice) in the spirit of the court’s invitation in Polygram Holding and
that these agencies should advance such presumptions. To do so, agencies should publish
a formal opinion acknowledging the problem of personalized pricing sustained by
vertical restraints and declare an intention to enforce them. Such an opinion should
also promulgate the specific factors that are to be considered when enforcing
against such practices and the exemptions to be applied, as described above. After
this opinion is published, the agencies should launch an investigation of large,
dominant firms that exercise personalized pricing and select appropriate cases to
be brought to court, thereby paving the way for private plaintiffs to do the same.
V. Conclusion

This article shows how personalized pricing—an extreme example of price
discrimination—could be affecting consumers’ day-to-day lives, arguing that even
if personalized pricing can be justified under some antitrust law standards, when
vertical restraints are imposed solely to sustain it, they deserve legal condemnation.
This article then argues that by lowering the standard for suits brought against such
vertical restraints, courts can take a step to adjust the law in the right direction.
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